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The Motive of the Incarnation in Christian Theology: 
 Consequences for Modern Cosmology,  Extraterrestrial Intelligence and  
an Hypothesis of Multiple Incarnations 
 
 




This paper addresses the question of the possibility of multiple species-specific incarnations of God in 
the societies of extraterrestrial beings (if they exist) on exoplanets,  proposed for the debate in a recent 
volume on Astrlotheology. It gives a scientific, philosophical and theological assessment of some of its 
claims and concludes by formulating the position of the author on multiple incarnations in the context 
of modern cosmology and Orthodox theology.   
 
Introduction  
This paper addresses the question of the possibility of multiple species-specific incarnations 
of God in the societies of extraterrestrial beings (if they exist) on exoplanets,  proposed for the 
debate in the volume on Astrlotheology.1 The strategy will be to respond to some claims in 
this book and conclude the discussion by formulating my personal position on multiple 
incarnations as I see it through the eyes of a cosmologist and an Orthodox theologian.   
 
 The major premise for such a debate originates in recent advances in observational 
astrophysics of exoplanets leading to a hypothesis that the necessary physical conditions for 
existence of carbon-based life-forms on these planets (similar to those on Earth) could entail 
that the sufficient conditions for their actual emergence, and emergence of intelligence are 
fulfilled. In other words, there is an inference: if exoplanets exist, then there can exist 
extraterrestrial intelligent life. Despite the fact that this assumption implies a biological 
reductionism, assuming intelligence as an epiphenomenon of the biological, it is considered in 
scientific circles as a reasonable extrapolation. Philosophy, which considers the phenomenon 
of humanity in a wider perspective (relating the human condition to personhood, morality, 
rationality etc.), doubts that the phenomenon of the Earthly humanity can be wide-spread and 
mediocre in the universe. Theology supports such a philosophical  caution by advocating the 
uniqueness of humanity as experiencing creaturehood, longing for immortality and attainment 
of the union with the creator. In both, philosophy and theology, the phenomenon of humanity 
is treated as distinctively unique with no justification within metaphysica generalis, that is as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 T. Peters (ed.),  Astrotheology. Science and Theology  Meet Extraterrestrial Life (Eugene, Oregon:  
Cascade Books, 2018). 
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unexplainable “event”.2 Theology strengthens this point by relating the phenomenon of 
humanity to God (Imago Dei), characterising it through the paradox of human subjectivity 
(being bodily in a particular location in the universe while being able to articulate the entire 
universe through consciousness), the paradox whose sense was explicated by Christ in the 
Incarnation. Correspondingly, if such a phenomenon of humanity is elevated to a mediocre 
status in the universe (in the hypothesis of extraterrestrial life), this kind of thinking is 
manifest of anthropomorphism in its strongest possible sense, transferring the human sense of 
existence from Earth to other locations in the universe.3 Only in this case the question about 
the moral predicaments of the supposed extraterrestrial beings, their religion and their 
salvation can be raised. Only in this case a theological question on whether the other beings 
need incarnation of the Word of God. Correspondingly, our assessment of existing views on 
multiple incarnations will be based on a premise that an epistemological anthropocentrism is 
present  in the very formulation of the problem (in spite of an initial intention to overcome 
such an anthropocentrism).  
 
Ted Peters in his paper “One incarnation or many?” lists four logical positions on the 
possibility of multiple incarnations of the Logos of God in different locations in the universe.4 
All these positions assume unconditionally two things: 1) there are necessary physical 
conditions in the universe such that the phenomenon of humanity and hence the Incarnation 
on Earth is possible in principle; 2) there have been actualised the sufficient conditions for the 
appearance of humanity in the universe and actual event of the Incarnation on Earth. There is 
a fundamental distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions: the necessary 
conditions can be interpreted in terms of the natural aspects of the universe by using science, 
whereas the sufficient conditions escape physical causality and place both the phenomenon of 
humanity, as well as the historical Incarnation in rubrics of “events” which escape description 
in terms of the underlying ontology. This means that the issue of existence of extraterrestrial 
life-forms, as well as multiple incarnations has sense not so much in the context of physics of 
the universe (covered by the necessary conditions), but related to some trans-natural,  
theological factors.  This is the reason why the four logical positions formulated by Peters on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 J.-L. Marion,  Certitudes negatives (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2010), pp. 8-50.    
3 This is the reason why Russels’s claim, based on the postulate of the “universality of imago Dei” 
(following in his logic from the similarity of the physical and moral conditions),   that God provides 
multiple incarnation wherever ETI has evolved (R. J. Russel, “Many Incarnations or One?” In T.Peters 
(ed.) Asthrotheology, pp. 303-305) seems to be philosophically unjustified.    
4 T. Peters, “One Incarnation or Many?”, Astrotheology, p. 297.  
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multiple incarnations are essentially reduced to the differences in theological views on the 
concreteness of the Incarnation and its link to the essence of humanity.  
 
The first, theological, alternative, according to Peters, is the difference between the 
position of whether the actual historical Incarnation was caused by the Fall of man in order to 
heal it, or the Incarnation would happen anyway regardless human actions and thus is inherent 
in the logic of creation of the world by God. Interestingly enough in both of these positions 
the cause of the Incarnation is shifted towards either the event of the Fall, or the creation. All 
discussions related to the causation between the Fall and the historical Incarnation are thus 
related to an attempt to formulate the sufficient conditions of the Incarnation in terms of the 
Fall. An alternative to this is to say that the actualisation of the sufficient conditions of the 
Incarnation has nothing to do with the Fall and human concerns, thus being inherent in the 
motive of creation in parallel with the necessary physical conditions. In both cases the 
historical contingency of the event of the Incarnation is neutralised by referring to some other 
inaugural events which acquire a status of the ultimate ontological justification.  If the world 
was initially created through physical laws in order to sustain human flesh in the state of the 
Fall, the real significance of the event of the Fall in the whole history of salvation becomes 
blurred, because the necessary conditions for existence of humanity in the state of the Fall (in 
“garments of skin”) are pre-existing in the very creation of the world.   
 
Then there is the second pair of logical positions, according to Peters, which brings 
into play human beings: if the Incarnation happened on this planet either because of the Fall 
or through the inherent logic of creation, the question is about its uniqueness. Whether its 
happening on Earth is unique and theologically sufficient for the whole universe (regardless 
alien life-forms)  or, it can happen somewhere else. As we stated above, the assumption of 
intelligent subjects elsewhere in the universe represents an anthropomorphic extrapolation of 
humanity into space. The assumption of the Incarnation on other planets then represents the 
fortification of this anthropomorphic stance even further, by assigning to other intelligent 
beings either the predicaments of humanity in its earthly condition, or by endowing alien 
forms of life by the dignity of the Imago Dei. In either cases  the major issue is on the sense 
of humanity in its link to the Incarnation and whether this sense can be transferred to other 
possible intelligent species in the universe.  
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 Peters himself takes, according to him, the most coherent position of a fix-a-broken-
creation Christology relying on the single  Earthly incarnation event.5 Robert Russel argues 
that God provides multiple incarnations wherever extraterrestrial intelligence  has evolved.6  
Peter Hess follows Russel by asserting  that “the postulation of multiple incarnations 
overcomes the time and distance problems, allowing the one God fellowship with creatures 
whenever and wherever they live throughout the universe.”7  Joshua Moritz takes a negative 
stance on multiple incarnations accentuating the central role of humanity in the universe as 
being “an elected image of God…chosen from among the myriad of life forms in the cosmos 
…and given the tasks of obedience and commandments, peace-keeping dominion, and 
cosmos-healing atonement.”8  My personal position radically differs from those ones of 
Russel and Hess, for I’ll argue that the hypothesis (postulation) of the multiple incarnations is 
an extreme anthropomorphic extrapolation having only an hypothetical and heuristic sense 
with no ontological justification.  As to Peter’s position I argue, contrary  to him, for the 
incarnation-anyway model with the exclusive role played by humanity in the Divine image 
similar to that which was advocated by Moritz, but inclining towards its fundamental 
theological-ontological exclusiveness related to unknowability of man by himself. It is this 
unknowability that entails the incomprehensibility of the  Incarnation and hence a purely 
hypothetical quest for its multiple doubles in other worlds. 
 
Centrality of Humanity: One Incarnation Suffices for the Entire Cosmos  
 
The phenomenon of humanity and the vision of Jesus Christ as  the incarnate Son  of God  
make the Incarnation an empirical fact, the fact which predetermines the contingent facticity 
of the whole universe. For the Word-Logos of God to assume human flesh, there must be this 
flesh. Since modern physics and biology are clear with respect to the necessary conditions of 
existence of such a flesh requiring at least ten billion years of a cosmological evolution, it 
seems evident that for the Incarnation to take place the necessary physical conditions must 
have been fulfilled. To have a body of Christ and his Mother (Virgin Mary) the universe must 
have had from the beginning the propensity to produce them. Correspondingly the ontological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Peters, “One Incarnation or Many?”,  p. 297, see also p. 272. 
6 Russel, “Many Incarnations or One?”, p. 303.  
7 P. M. J. Hess, “Multiple Incarnation of the One Christ”, Astrotheology, p. 327. 
8 J. M.  Moritz, “One Imago Dei and the Incarnation of the Eschatological Adam”, in Astrotheology, p. 
344.  
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aspect of the Incarnation9 is always present  in the reversed history of the universe as it is 
described in modern cosmology.10 According to T. Torrance the whole surrounding world, 
being created freely in the act of Love between the Persons of the Holy Trinity the world, 
exhibits nevertheless contingent necessity related to its physical structure, its space and 
temporal span, encoding the motive of the Incarnation in the fabric of creation.11  Torrance 
related the whole spatial structure of the universe (which is responsible for the necessary 
conditions of existence for all constituents of the universe12) to the Incarnation.13  By uniting 
hypostatically his Divine nature with human nature, the Logos subjected the freedom of 
creation to its particular realisation in human flesh. The Incarnation, being an “event” in space 
and time defines the modus of existence of  the universe being implicitly present in the motive 
of creation.  
 
 As an empirical fact the Incarnation is intimately linked to humanity as part of 
creation. Maximus the Confessor, for example, refers to  man created  in the image of God as 
a key to understanding creation in his  process of divinization when he may elevate it to the 
supreme level of its full soteriological comprehension. Since the actual historical Incarnation 
happens in the midst of the human subset of the universe (recapitulating the universe on the 
level of consubstantiality and epistemological acquisition), its proper sense can be directly 
related to the constitution and meaning of the cosmos.14 In this case one can claim that by 
contributing to the constitution of the cosmos, the Incarnation predetermines the existence of 
other exoplanets and possible life-forms thus involving them into its own logic from the 
beginning of the world. Then one can infer that the necessary conditions for existence of alien 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The ontological view of the Incarnation can be seen through a modern theological development 
called “deep Incarnation” (N. Gregersen, “The Cross of Christ in and Evolutionary World”, Dialog: A 
Journal of Theology, vol. 40, n. 3 , 2001, pp. 192-207). 
10 These conditions are summarised in various versions of the Anthropic Principle (AP), which detects 
consubstantiality of the physical stuff of the universe and human corporeal beings. Seen in this angle a 
hypothesis of the alien corporeal intelligence represents the extension of the AP with respect to other 
life-forms. In this sense when one invokes an idea of  alien life one does not overcome 
anthropocentrism (whereas one can claim that it overcomes geocentrism) on the substantial level, for 
the physical and biological stuff on other planets will be the same, consisting of the evolutionary 
products of the burning stars.  
11 T. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998).   
12 The dimension of space d=3, for example, is responsible for the stability of atoms and hence all 
astrophysical objects.    
13 The Strong AP transform into a Theo-Anthropic Principle related not to the possibility of a 
biological organization of man, but to the possibility of the Incarnation.   
14 See e.g.  L. Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press. 1985), p. 
76 referring to Maximus’ Questions to Thalassius 35.    
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forms of life in some other locations in the universe have in their deep foundation the logic of 
the Incarnation on Earth, not requiring any ad extra, related to the physico-biological 
functioning of these aliens. In this sense the existence of Earth and human beings represents 
that fact which suffice for a claim  that the necessary conditions of the Incarnation are 
fulfilled  in the entire cosmos. 
 
 At the same time the actual happening of the Incarnation provides us with the 
transcendent indications (paradeigmata)  of the undisclosed sufficient conditions responsible 
for existence of intelligible life and hence the articulated image of the universe. The sufficient 
conditions for the Incarnation are not part of   the underlying ontology  of the world and here 
the revelational aspect of the Incarnation that enters the discussion framed in terms of the 
inauguration of the Kingdom of God. Then there is a question: do the contingent sufficient 
conditions for a single historical Incarnation on Earth entail the necessity of its salvific 
consequences in the whole universe? If humanity is unique, then the Incarnation is addressed 
to this humanity and, strictly speaking, has a very tangential meaning to the rest of the 
universe. In this case it is humanity that is responsible for the salvation of the entire cosmos. 
If, on the contrary, one assumes existence of different forms of intelligent life, what is not 
clear is their relation to the Earthly Incarnation. One does not mean the physical conditions of 
their existence, but the relevance of their existence to God of Christian Faith. Indeed, all 
species in the universe were created by the same divine Logos, but the Incarnation is not part 
of the natural conditions in the world. Even if the world was created in order to attain the 
union with God, it is humanity which is granted the means of such an attainment through a 
special call. The possibility of such an attainment effectively contributes to the definition of 
man: only in communion with God man becomes “himself.”15 In this sense man, in spite of 
being consubstantial to the visible creation and having solidarity with it, is a special creation 
whose essence requires grace, the mechanism of acquiring of which proceeds through the 
Incarnation.16 On this basis I doubt any evidence that the rational creatures would be by 
nature attuned to the presence of God. 17  If this would be true, we should identify these 
creatures with humanity. But this seems to be weak not only scientifically, but first of all 
philosophically: we do not have any evidence whatsoever to expect to encounter another type 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 J. Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness (London: T&T Clark, 2006),  p. 248. 
16 This goes contrary to that which Russel asserts that “God’s grace will redeem and sanctify every 
species in which reason and moral conscience are kindled” (Russel, p. 305) unless the mentioned 
species is part of the humankind.   
17 Peters, p. 285 
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of “humanity” in a different world, unless we produce this “humanity” ourselves in a manner 
of science fiction. If this would be the case, still it is the Earthly humanity would have 
responsibility for “off-world doubles.”  
 
In view of that which has been said it seems to us that the idea of multiple incarnations 
can only be exercised with respect to those extra-terrestrials which have the same 
“anthropology”, that is if they represent a copy of humanity. In this case the Earthly 
Incarnation will be sufficient for redemption of the off-world siblings.  In all other cases the 
very supposition that the incarnational narrative can be transferred to other locations and other 
species of living beings in the universe remains an unjustified hypothesis.   
 
The Orthodox Position: Single Anyway Incarnation (the Arch Creation-Deification 
versus the Arch Fall-Redemption)  
 
The formulation of the Orthodox position on multiple incarnations starts from a referral to the 
ancient question of why God became man (Curs Deus Homo?). The traditional link between 
the Fall and the Incarnation is that the latter is treated as a redeeming act of God towards 
saving the transgressing humanity.  The discussion of “Cur Deus Homo?” has never been a 
part of the canonical corpus of Orthodox literature and constituted, in words of G. Florovsky, 
a theologumenon (theological opinion). However Florovsky pointed towards a connection 
between creation and the Incarnation, as being, de facto, a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the created to be brought to union with God. In other words, the motive of the Incarnation 
is linked to the aim of creation. According to Florovsky, “It seems that the ‘hypothesis’ of an 
Incarnation apart from the Fall is at least permissible in the system of Orthodox theology and 
fits as well enough in the mainstream of Patristic teaching. An adequate answer to the 
‘motive’ of the Incarnation can be given only in the context of the general doctrine of 
Creation.”18 On the other hand, according to Maximus the Confessor, the creation of the 
world contained the goal for which all things were created: “For it is for Christ, that is, for the 
Christic mystery, that all time and all that is in time has received in Christ its beginning and 
its end.”19  It is in this sense that the motives of creation and the Incarnation are inextricably  
intertwined.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 G. Florovsky, “Cur Deus Homo? The motive of the Incarnation”,  in Creation and Redemption, The 
collected works of Georges Florovsky , vol. III, (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland Publishing Company, 
1976), p. 170 (Emphasis added). 
19 Maximus the Confessor, Questions to Thalassius, 60.   
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 In accordance with this and, as we articulated above, the structure of the created world 
intrinsically contains the conditions for the possibility of the Incarnation. However, there 
remains a basic question on whether the actual happening of the Incarnation depends on 
human actions and the Incarnation becomes a measure to rectify the human fault. By linking 
the motive of the Incarnation to the intrinsic logic of creation of the world by God, Orthodox 
theology extends the scope of the Incarnation beyond the opposition Fall-Redemption,  
towards a more wider span of the plan of salvation as related to the deification of man and 
bringing the whole creation to the union with God. The lesser arch of the Fall-Redemption 
becomes a tool in restoring the greater arch Creation-Deification. 20  In this sense the 
conditioning of the Incarnation by the human concerns would be a mistake: “Christ is not a 
mere event or happening in history. The incarnation of the divine Logos was not a simple 
consequence of the victory of the devil over man…The union of the divine and the human 
natures took place because it fulfilled the eternal will of God”21 so that it “…showed us that 
this was why we were created, and that this was God’s good purpose concerning us from 
before ages, a purpose which was realised through the introduction of another, newer 
mode,”22 that is the entrance of  “the incorporeal and incorruptible and immaterial Word of 
God [into] our world.”23 A famous phrase from Athanasius that God “assumed humanity that 
we might be made God”24 implies that humanity, being created, has a potential to be in union 
with God (not based in the natural laws related to creation). One can say stronger that a 
creaturely modus of existence becomes unavoidable for  the very possibility of deification. 
The integrity of the human commitment to its transfiguration was expressed  by Maximus the 
Confessor advocating the mediating role of man in overcoming the moral tensions between 
different parts of creation 25 , including, one can suggest, extraterrestrials. Man is the 
“microcosm” who resumes, condenses, recapitulates in himself the degrees of the created 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 A. Louth, “The place of Theosis in Orthodox theology”, in Partakes of the Divine Nature: The 
History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, M. J. Christensen  and J. A. 
Wittung  (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press), p. 34-35.  
21 P. Nellas, Deification in Christ. Orthodox Perspectives on the Nature of the Human  Person 
(Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997), p. 37 (emphasis added). 
22 Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua, PG 91: 1097C [ET: On Difficulties in the Church Fathers. The 
Ambigua. Vol. 1., Ed. and tr. N. Constas, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014, p. 131-
133] 
23 Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 8 [ET: Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press 1996, p. 33]. 
24 Athanasius, On the Incarnation  54 [ET: p. 93]. 
25 See, for example, L. Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology 
 of Maximus the Confessor  (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), pp. 387-427. 
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being and because of this he can know the universe from within.”26 Correspondingly, if God’s 
plan “consists in deification of the created world” (some parts of which imply salvation), the 
plausibility of the plan of deification is rooted in the fact that man is ontologically united with 
the created nature.  Correspondingly man’s created propensities placed in the framework of 
his Divine image would  be sufficient to transfer the aim of creation, revealed through the 
Incarnation,  to other alien beings. In this sense Orthodox theology links the Incarnation to 
humanity as that subset of the created universe which is capable of conducting a mediating 
role between different parts of creation, creation and God, where creation includes all alien 
forms of intelligence. 
 
 The cosmic sense of the Incarnation is articulated by Maximus the Confessor 
differently as such an event that brought a landmark in the temporal evolution of the universe, 
namely the division of its temporal span onto two fundamentally different aeons: “… 
according to this plan, it is clear that God wisely divided ‘the ages’ between those intended 
for God to become human, and those  intended for humanity to become divine.”27  This sheds 
the light on the inclusion of the lesser arch of Fall-Redemption into the greater one of 
Creation-Deification as the different degrees of  participation in God. This excludes a 
possibility of treating the movement from creation to deification through the Incarnation as a 
“natural process” inherent in the fabric of creation. On  the one hand created things  
participate in God through the fact of their existence, that is through “being in communion.”   
However, when Maximus enquires in the human capacity of deification, he stresses that it 
does not belong to man’s natural capacity: “…what takes place would no longer be 
marvellous if divinization occurred simply in accordance with the receptive capacity of 
nature.”28  Maximus is concerned with the reciprocity between God and man. However the 
“reciprocity” has a passive character until the movement of God towards man fulfils in the 
Incarnation. The reciprocity by creation in the perspective of the Incarnation, however, does 
not achieve  the likeness of man to God. This is the reason why Maximus claims that the aeon 
after the Incarnation corresponds to a contrary movement of man to God, whose very 
possibility was effected by the Incarnation.  By separating the aeons before and after the 
Incarnation Maximus makes a difference between the participation in God which is bestowed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 O. Clément, “Le sense de la terre” Le Christ terre des vivants. Essais théologiques. 
 spiritualite  orientale, n. 17, (Bégrolles-en-Mauges: Abbaye de Bellfontaine, 1976)  p. 90.   
27 Ibid.  
28 Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 20 [ET: Nicholas Constas, On  the Difficulties in the Church 
Fathers, The Ambigua, vol. 1 (London & Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2104),  p. 411].  
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to man by creation and that participation which is bestowed by deification. The latter requires 
grace which  is not implanted in the natural conditions of existence, but which is bestowed by 
God on the grounds of man’s personal  extent of perfection.29 This grace can be acquired by 
man and used for the transfiguration of the universe, including the alien species.  
 
 However, in view  of the fact that life and intelligence emerged recently in history of 
the universe, the claim of the central role of humanity for the deification of the universe, 
including possible alien life-forms, demands a comment. Indeed, the phenomenon of 
humanity is a very short fragment of the universal history. The main question that remains is 
not about the participation of possible extra-terrestrial aliens in God bestowed by their being 
created but about their possible participation in deification  before and after the event of the 
Incarnation on Earth. As we have discussed above, this event predetermines not only the 
representation of the universe by humanity, not only it anticipates the future Kingdom, but, de 
facto, defines the whole span of creation from the past to the future. 30 Here is an inherent 
eschatological dynamics31 which drives material creation, including possible aliens forms of 
life,  to perfection  in God. By paraphrasing  Peters, the Incarnation is an abbreviated cipher 
for the entire human life and  death, the promise for the resurrection and  renewal of all that 
exists in the creation.32 If the Incarnation was thought by God before the ages, its transcendent 
efficacy as of the event happened two thousand years in Palestine, being, by (as a motive of 
creation) commensurable with the whole span of the universe, has the sense of the inaugural 
event granting the universe its past and its (transfigured) future, exceeding the measure of the 
quality and quantity, beyond modality and relation, the manifestation of the impossible in that 
which has become possible.    
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 L. Thunberg, with reference to Maximus, asserts: “There is in man no natural power that can deify 
him, but there exists on the other hand a reciprocal relationship between God and man that permits 
him to become deified to the degree in which the effects of the Incarnation are conferred on him” 
(Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos, p. 55). 
30 Marcus Plested in his paper  on pneumatology and new creation in Macarius of Egypt recapitulates 
the latter in following words: “But need realities such as the Fall be considered solely in linear terms? 
Might we not think of the Fall  rather like a crack in the ice, spreading in all directions (and 
dimensions) from its center?...Might not the very fabric of creation be patterned on and adapted to the 
drama of Fall and Redemption in a non-linear and non-historical fashion?”  (M. Plested, 
Pneumatology and the New Creation in the Macarian Writings: An Ecumenical Legacy”, in M. 
Welker (ed.), The Spirit in Creation and new Creation  (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 2012),  p. 
169-170.   
31 T. Peters, M. Hewlett, Evolution from Creation to New Creation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2003),  
p. 163. 
32 C.f. Peters, p. 300.  
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Conclusion 
 
In view of Ted Peters’ classification of four logical positions with respect to the hypothesis of 
multiple incarnations, our position corresponds to anyway-incarnation model that relies upon 
a single Incarnation on Earth. Here is the recapitulation of my main points which rule out 
other logical positions.  
 
1.   The actual existence of humanity on Earth and the historical event of assumption of 
human flesh by God  provides one with the evidence that the necessary physical conditions 
for the possibility of the Incarnation are fulfilled in the universe (anthropic principle, specific 
structure of space (Torrance), deep incarnation (Gregersen)) so that multiple incarnations (if 
they imply a similar mechanism) cannot be excluded on physical grounds. The issue becomes 
strictly theological and philosophical.  
 
2. The historical incarnation of Christ is theologically treated as a contingently-necessary 
outcome of the arch of Creation-Deification, that is that motive of creation which can 
potentially lead (through man) to the attainment of the union with God. The role of humanity 
is not to condition the facticity the Incarnation through the Fall, but to use it as an archetype 
of acquiring grace making possible man’s deification, renewal of creation and its 
transfiguration. Thus the Incarnation on Earth inaugurating the Kingdom of God suffices for 
transfiguration of all creation including alien forms of intelligence. On the grounds of this we 
consider a fix-a-broken-creation Christology as an incomplete constituent of the greater arch 
Creation-Deification.  
 
3.  Since the essence of humanity relies not only on a physico-biological structure but on the 
archetype of the Incarnate Son of God, the Incarnation can be treated as the constitutive 
principle of the human hypostatic intelligence on Earth, providing humanity with the 
mechanism of attainment of communion with God-creator. The latter is not implanted in the 
natural conditions of humanity and requires grace through an exercise of a particular type of 
transcendence pertaining to humanity as a special creation in the image of God. Hence there is 
no logical necessity for the Incarnation of the Son of God on other planets unless one makes 
an unjustified extrapolation of the human condition to other life-forms in the universe. Any 
speculation on the multiple incarnations seems to be an exercise of a strong “incarnational 
anthropocentrism” which is admissible epistemologically, but not ontologically.    
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4. The Incarnation of the Son of God on Earth cannot be considered in isolation from the 
totality of the Christ-event that includes Resurrection, Ascension and the entrance of the Holy 
Spirit in the channels of history (Pentecost) within the arch creation-deification. Since this 
event happened on Earth, the latter is considered as soteriologically central in the universe. 
Earth’s cosmographic mediocrity (implied by the discovery of exoplanets) does not influence 
its theological centrality. Indeed, according to Torrance, the universe is uniformly theogenic 
(God is present everywhere) thus effectively making the location of the Incarnation 
theologically equivalent to all possible locations in the universe. Thus the fundamental 
alteration in the order of nature effected in the Resurrection of Christ on Earth (impossible 
without the Incarnation), being an initial step in transfiguration of the universe, is efficacious 
for the whole creation.    
 
